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TALMUDIC JURISPRUDENCE, EQUITY,
AND THE CONCEPT OF
LIFNIM MESHURA T HADIN
By JAMES A. DIAMOND*
In the beginning G-d created the world with the attribute of strict Law. Upon
the realization that the world could not withstand this (as a blueprint for its exis-
tence), He tempered Law with the attribute of Mercy.'
Without justice, life would not be possible and, even if it were, it would not be
worthwhile. 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the Jewish legal tradition, ethics and law, conscience and legal
obligations are inextricably bound together in an attempt to raise the human
condition above a robot-like obedience to black-letter legislation. The Talmud
recognized that moral deliberations often lead to responses in man's relations
and dealings with his fellow man different than those imposed upon him by
the law. From the period of Ecclesiastes' 3 cynical assertion that "under the
sun the place of judgment,... wickedness was there .. .",4, to the Talmudic
observation that, "Where there is law there is no charity,"' right to the con-
temporary speculation by Cardozo that, "When talking about justice, the
quality we have in mind is charity, and this, though one quality, is often
contrasted with the other," - Jewish legal scholars were aware of the chasm
between law and justice. Talmudic jurisprudence attempted to remedy that
anomalous situation by developing various principles of equity, among which
that of Lifnim meshurat hadin or "beyond the strict line of the law" exem-
plifies the preference displayed for following moral dictates rather than legal
precedents. Although because of the distinct nature of Jewish law,7 a wholly
© Copyright; 1979, J.A. Diamond.
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I Author's translation of Midrash in Rashi Genesis 1:1.2 Del Vecchio, Justice, An Historical and Philosophical Essay (New York: Philo-
sophical Library, 1953) at 177.
8 Traditionally attributed to King Solomon who, interestingly enough, was respected
as a just ruler in that he was extremely innovative in the manner in which he meted out
justice during his rule, combining legal wisdom with common sense; witness the famous
case of authenticating a child's true parent in a very unorthodox fashion.
4 Ecclesiastes 3:16.
5 Babylonian Talmud, ed. Epstein (London: Soncino Press, 1935) at Nezikin III,
Sanhedrin 6b. The Hebrew word for "charity" has as its root the word for "justice."
6 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924) at 87.
7 That is, rooted in a divine source where there is an integral link between law and
morality.
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separate institutional framework based on equity did not arise as in the Eng-
lish legal tradition, the basic catalyst for the formulation of those principles
was essentially identical:
[to] correct Men's Consciences for Frauds, Breaches of Trusts, Wrongs and Op-
pressions of what Nature soever they be, and to soften and mollify the Extremity
of the Law, which is called Summum Jus.8
The intention of this paper is to examine the role attributed to Lifnim
meshurat hadin (hereafter referred to as Lifnim) within the framework of
Jewish law and to see whether it was incorporated as a valid and judicially
accepted legal maxim. We are confronted with an early attempt to bridge the
gap between strict law and good conscience, while still maintaining a con-
sistent legal system. It was not allowed to become the subject of fancifuljudicial whims, but rather, "[H]ebrew Yosher (equity), like English equity,
walks in the paths of the law; it is its reflecting shadow."9
II. THE NATURE OF LIFNIM MESHURAT HADIN
Nahamanides, the great medieval legal scholar and philosopher, in ex-
plicating the methodology of the Torah,'0 stated:
[S]uch is the way of the Torah, that after it lists certain specific prohibitions, it
includes them all in a general precept. Thus, after warning with detailed laws re-
garding all business dealings between people such as not to steal .... He said in
general "And thou shalt do that which is right and good,""1 thus including under
a positive commandment the duty of doing that which is right and agreeing to a
compromise ... as well as all requirements to act [lifnim meshurat hadin] for the
sake of pleasing one's fellow man. 12
The fact that the equitable concept is rooted in and derived from an
actual commandment renders it as an incorporated aspect of the law itself.
If the situation demands it, then one is both ethically and legally bound by
the precepts of the Torah not to insist on one's rights as defined by the strict
letter of the law but, rather, to agree to act beyond that narrow legalistic
realm. An excellent illustration of this principle is one involving the question
of liability of a money-changer (ShuIhani) who errs in his assessments. The
Talmud grants an exemption from liability for judgment errors to that cate-
gory of people who are exceptional experts absolutely trained and competent
in their field. It is then related 3 that R. Hiyya made an erroneous judgment
in his capacity as an expert money-changer and yet assumed liability for his
mistake. The Talmud then reconciles R. Hiyya's act with the apparently
contradictory law by concluding that R. Hiyya was motivated by the principle
of Lifnim. The law (Din) can only impose a fixed, objective set of rules and
guidelines to a certain class of situations which can only be of a general
nature. On the other hand, Lifnim operates within what has been termed the
8 Earl of Oxford's Case, 1 Ch. Rep. 1 at 7, 21 E.R. 485 at 486.
9 Silberg, Talmudic Law and the Modern State (New York: Burning Bush Press,
1973) at 94.
1o The Hebrew Bible.
11 Deuteronomy 6:18.
12 Ramban (Nachamanides), Commentary on the Torah - Leviticus, trans. Chaval
(New York: Shilo Publishing House, 1974) at 283-84.
13 The Talmud, Nezikin I, Baba Kamma 99b.
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"sphere of contextual morality."'14 R. Hiyya confronted the predicament at
hand and did not blindly turn to a pre-formulated directive for guidance, but
rather employed his own moral standards to accomplish that "which is right
and good" under the unique and particular circumstances presented to him.
The Talmud then continues exegetically to derive the principle of Lifnim
from a verse in the Torah,15 which in effect burdened one with a formal
obligation to look beyond strict legal principles when the rule of equity and
good conscience demands it.
The basic make-up of the concept of Liinim, though, is such that it is
excluded from being utilized as a forensic tool in the formulation of legal
rules. Talmudic law propounded the rule that gifts or sales subject to express
or manifestly implied conditions remain voidable until such time as those
conditions are fulfilled. 1 The question is then raised as to how the rule
should be applied to the hypothetical where a man sold a plot of land but on
concluding the sale he was no longer in need of the money. The Talmud
attempts a resolution of the matter based on the following actual occurrence:
There was a certain man who sold land to R. Papa because he was in need
of money to acquire oxen, and, as eventually the seller no longer needed the
funds, R. Papa returned the land to him. The Talmud then rejects this as a
valid proof since it is determined that R. Papa acted Lifnim. The Talmud
proceeds to the conclusion, via the citation of a different case, that in such
situations the sale may indeed be withdrawn.' Actions influenced by the
principle of Lifnim are deemed insufficient authority in resolving a certain
undetermined state of a law. This is consistent with the essential purpose of
Lifnim, which is "to evaluate and intuit the best way of eliciting maximal
good from the existential predicament confronting him,"' 8 and not to formu-
late general rules governing categories of cases linked together by certain
common denominators. It is often the practice of the Talmud that the actions
of noted legal scholars and jurists are used as a basis for the formation and
development of the law. Precedents can be set not only on the basis of what
judges declare from the safety of the Bench, but on what they do in their
capacities as members of the community at large. But, if their actions are
prompted by subjective notions of justice transcending the strictly legal frame-
work, then no ratio can be extracted. Since the influence of equity and good
conscience can, as described by Selden's aphorism in relation to early English
equity, "vary as the length of the Chancellor's foot," so R. Papa's personal
actions could not form a constructive basis for eliciting a law of sale.
Unlike the separation between the ecclesiastical and civil courts in Eng-
land, the nature of the Jewish legal system was such that it could not give
rise to such a phenomenon. The same body of legislation and regulations
14 Lichtenstein, "Does Jewish Tradition Recognize an Ethic Independent of Hala-
kha?", in Fox, ed., Modern Jewish Ethics, Theory and Practice (Columbus: Ohio State
University Press, 1975) at 78.
15 Exodus 18:20.
16 The Talmud, supra note 5, at Nashim IV, Kiddushin 49b.
17 The Talmud, id. at Nashim II, Ketuboth 97a.
18 Lichtenstein, supra note 14.
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governed both the religious and civil spheres of life, as both were viewed as
a unified whole deriving their existence from the same Divine source. It is
no surprise, then, to encounter the concept of Lifnim in legal discussions
concerning matters of ritual which may enlighten us further as to its nature
within the system as a whole. There is a requirement of a quorum of at least
three people before a group is allowed to issue an "invitation" (Zimun) to
each other to say the grace after a meal. According to the Talmud, the law
is that one may be called to interrupt his meal in order to oblige another two
who wish to perform Zimun, but two do not break to oblige one. An incident
is then cited to the contrary where R. Papa and another paused in the midst
of their meal for his son to perform Zimun. The Talmud dismisses this as a
valid adverse authority in the same fashion it did with the previously men-
tioned incident involving R. Papa by attributing his actions to the influencing
factor of Liinim.19 RashF2 comments that R. Papa's benevolence in this case
sprang out of his desire to show respect for his son. In R. Papa's assessment
of the situation, the general rule of law covering the class of cases that have
the common characteristic of three people eating as a group would result in
an unconscionable act if applied strictly to the existential predicament con-
fronting him at the moment. Again we see that the nature and purpose of
Lifnim is to compensate for the inevitable situations arising in the realm of
delicate interpersonal relationships which cannot possibly be governed justly
or respectably by the general letter of the law. In order to subsist, human
relations and society as a whole require something over and above a purely
legalistic outlook on the part of the individual members of the community.
An opinion quoted in the Mishnah2l characterizes such a strictly dogmatic
attitude as wicked from the highest point of view by asserting that, "[h]e that
says 'what is mine is mine and what is thine is thine' . . . . some say that this
is the type of Sodom." 22 Though such a person acts within the confines of
the law, he contributes to the disintegration of society by his insistence on
viewing each individual as a self-contained bundle of legal rights.
III. THE JUDICIAL ROLE AND THE DUTY TO ARBITRATE
Whereas the principles of equity in Roman and English law could only
be accommodated by the creation of separate legal institutions originating in
the prerogative of the Praetor or the Chancellor, in Jewish law no such split
occurred because the concept of aequitas (Lifnim) was incorporated into the
very fabric of the Jewish jus scriptum (Torah) itself. In contradistinction to
the Roman and English concept of appealing to "higher" bodies of law which
are designated as the arbiters of justice founded on conscience, it seems that
in Jewish law, Lifnim imposes a reciprocal duty on both the regular members
of the judiciary and the individual members of the community to strive for
19 The Talmud, supra note 5, at Zera'im, Berakoth 45b.
20 A Jewish medieval scholar who commented extensively on the Talmud.
21 The Mishnah, trans. Danby (London: Oxford University Press, 1974) at 457 -
Pirke Aboth 5.10.
22 The author has interpreted this to mean "I insist on my legal right and all that
I am legally entitled to and recognize in turn your legal rights. That is my sole guideline
in life."
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equitable results whenever possible. According to Rashi and Nahamanides,
the commandment "to do that which is right and good," is in fact an order
for contending parties to embark upon a process of compromise in order to
reach an acceptable settlement before plunging into litigation. Alongside that
duty, there exists a duty on the court to persuade the parties to submit to
arbitration, rather than have it act in its strict judicial capacity to impose a
settlement that does not tend to promote amicable relations. R. Judah ben
Korha declared that "[s]ettlement by arbitration is a meritorious act ....
[W]hat is the kind of justice with which peace abides?-We must say: Arbi-
tration," 23 the obvious reason being that the strict application of law does not
always lead to peace between contentious civil litigants. The Shuihan Aruch24
burdens the judge with a moral obligation, before commencing the case, to
present a choice to the litigants as to whether they wish to proceed by strict
law or by arbitration.2 5 The code goes so far as to suggest that the judge has
the reserve discretion to impose a settlement based on principles of arbitra-
tion and compromise, without consent of the litigants, where on the facts of
the case no proper legal resolution of the matter can be arrived at with any
reasonable degree of clarity. Such a ruling is consistent with the Talmudic
maxim that in the end a judge's only concern and recourse is towards "what
he actually sees with his own eyes." 20 In matters where he must rely on his
own judgment, reasoning and common sense, the equitable principle of Lilnim
is given the possibility of free rein over a judge's deliberations as to the case
before him.
While examining the role that Lifnim plays as a judicial standard, it is
of assistance to delve into the Aggadic or theologic usage of the term found
in the Talmud. One passage relates that R. Ishmael bestowed a blessing upon
G-d consisting of the following:
[May] Thy mercy ... prevail over Thy other attributes, so that Thou mayest deal
with Thy children according to the attribute of mercy and mayest on their behalf,
stop short of the limit of strict justice! 27
G-d is then said to have nodded his head in agreement. Strict application of
the law may result in judgments of such a harsh nature that society would
not be able to sustain them. Judgments must be tempered by the principle
of Lifnim, identified here with the attribute of mercy, and it seems that in his
capacity as an arbitrator, the judge is called upon to reflect the manner in
which the Absolute Judge conducts his court.
Another intriguing passage describes G-d's dispensation of justice in the
following fashion:
While occupied with the Torah which Scripture designates as truth,' the Holy One
will not [act Lifnim]; (but when sitting in) judgment, which is not designated by
Scripture as 'truth', the Holy One ... may [act Lifnim] towards mercy.28
23 The Talmud, supra note 5, at Nezikin ITT, Sanhedrin 6b.
24 A definitive legal code compiled by Joseph Karo.
25 Id., at Hoshen Mishpat Laws of Judges 12:2 (as translated by the author).
26 The Talmud, supra note 5, at Nezikin Irl, Sanhedrin 6b.
27 The Talmud, id. at Zera'im, Berakoth 7a.
28 The Talmud, id. at Nezikin IV, Abodah Zara 4b (emphasis added).
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Truth, which the Talmud identifies with the Torah or the jus scriptum, is
not necessarily sought after nor arrived at when dispensing judgments. The
Talmud here offers us a provocative insight into the way it perceived the
nature and goal of adjudicating an issue. It is not an exclusively truth-seeking
process ("truth" in the sense of the Talmud's identification of it with the
definitive legal compendium of human conduct, i.e., the Torah), but is con-
cerned as well with meting out fairness and equity wherever possible. If
Divine judgment itself allows Lifnim to enter its considerations even at the
expense of what the Talmud terms "truth," then surely at the human level
equity may prevail over "truth" to produce a fair and just verdict.
IV. LEGISLATED EQUITY
The Maggid Mishneh, a commentator on Maimonides' code, asserted:
the intention of the verse "to do that which is right and good," is to promote and
maintain civilized relations between men. It would not have been fitting to com-
mand details, for the commandments of the Torah are eternal and immutable
whereas man's characteristics vary according to the time and the unique individual.
Therefore the Rabbis set down details falling under the principles some of which
they posted as absolute Din (law) and others only by way of Hasidut (advisory in
nature) .29
There are a few instances in the Talmud where the principle of "to do
that which is right and good," is actually embodied by the Rabbis in concrete
legislation. The verse provides a source of authority upon which the Rabbis
could exercise a certain degree of innovation and creativity in keeping abreast
of the rapidly changing social and economic conditions of the time. The pre-
cepts of equity posited by the Torah were, in effect, for active legislation.
Although, as mentioned previously, they could not attribute any authority to
precedents motivated by Lifnim as adequate proof for new enactments, they
themselves could enact sorely needed legislation as a response to the demands
of the times that people are required "to do that which is right and good."
The following are notable examples of Din (law) emerging from principles
of equity rather than being derived juristically from scriptural passages:
29 Mishneh Torah (Tel Aviv: Am Olam, 1959) at Maggid Mishneh on the Rambam
Hilkhot Shekhenim 14:5. For similar expressions of the same idea see St. Thomas
Aquinas, 1 Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the Dominican Province (New York:
Benzinger Brothers, Inc., 1947) Pt. 1-11, Q. 96, Art. 6, at 1021:
The observance of some point of law conduces to the common weal in the majority
of instances and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful. Since then the law-giver cannot
have in view every single case, he shapes the law according to what happens most
frequently, by directing his attention to the common good. Wherefore if a case can
arise wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful to the general welfare,
it should not be observed.
See also: American Law Institute, 2 Restatement of Torts (St. Paul: American Law
Institute Publishers, 1934) at 754:
Many statutes are so worded as apparently to express a universally obligatory rule
of conduct. Such enactments, however, may in view of their purpose and spirit be
properly construed as intended to apply only to ordinary situations and to be sub-ject to the qualifications that the conduct prohibited thereby is not wrongful if,
because of an emergency or the like, the circumstances justify an apparent disobe-
dience to the letter of the enactment.
1979]
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(a) Dina Debar Mitzra (Right of Preemption) :30 A person who pos-
sesses land abutting the land of a seller enjoys a right of preemption in regard
to the land for sale. If the seller proceeds to sell to a third party, the abutter
has the right to demand the transfer to himself of the field upon payment to
the buyer of the original price agreed upon. The Rabbis introduced this law
to remove the buyer for the sake of the neighbouring land-owner because of
the verse "to do that which is right and good." The reason given is the fact
that there is no difference to the seller as to whom he sells to as long as he
gets the same value, plus the fact that it can be of utmost importance for the
abutter to own adjoining tracts of land far outweigh any injury that may
occur to the buyer on account of being removed from the land.81 It is inter-
esting to note that since equity brought the law into existence, all applications
of the rule to various manifestations of the situation were governed consis-
tently by the same principle of equity. A number of exceptions were therefore
appended to the general rule where it was deemed inequitable to the buyer
or seller to have it enforced. In many ways this resembles the English maxim
that "equity follows the law," or, as formulated by Lord Tomlin:
[l]n order to invoke a rule of equity it is necessary in the first instance to establish
the existence of a state of circumstances, which attracts the equitable jurisdic-
tion... X
Thus, for example, if removing the buyer will be to the detriment of the
seller by prejudicing other intended transactions with the same buyer, the rule
is excepted.33 On the other hand, the buyer may be adversely affected if he
belongs to a class of persons for whom the courts act as guardians, e.g.,
orphaned minors, and who command a higher degree of equity in commercial
transactions. Their equity prevails over that of the abutter's.3 4 Once the rule
was grounded in equity it remained the decisive factor in all situations where
various equities could conflict.
(b) Shuma Hadra (Right of Redemption) :35 In the Talmud, if a loan
is based upon a written instrument, then the creditor has a right to have a
writ of execution issued by the court authorizing him to seize the debtor's
land in satisfaction of the debt. The Rabbis then added the caveat that such
lands appraised and foreclosed by the creditor could always be redeemed
by the debtor on payment of the original debt, because of the verse "to do
that which is right and good." Again, the reason for this is that the creditor
is not adversely affected by the return of the foreclosed property as it can be
said to the creditor, "The only claim you had against the debtor is money
and now you have it!" Thus the commandment to act conscionably burdens
3o The Talmud, supra note 5, at Nezikin I, Baba Metz'a 108a.
31 The author has interpreted Rashi's commentary on the text (id.) to mean "a legal
fiction was introduced in order to preserve the integrity of the law, i.e., the buyer was
deemed an agent of the abutter; thus the closing of the deal with the buyer automatically
transferred the property to the abutter."
3 2 Maine and New Brunswick Electrical Power Co. v. Hart, [1929] A.C. 631 (P.C.)
at 640.
33 The Talmud, supra note 5, at Nezikin I, Baba Metz'a 108b.
34 Id., and Mishneh Torah, supra note 29, at Hilkhot Shekhenim 12:3.
35 The Talmud, supra note 5, at Nezikin I, Baba Metz'a 16b and 35a.
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the creditor with the obligation, by law, to return the property to its original
owner. Once again equity governs throughout. The Talmud also rules that in
the case where the creditor who foreclosed had sold the property to a third
party, the original debtor's right of redemption is extinguished because his
equitable rights cannot defeat the equity of a bona fide purchaser for value
who obviously intended to own land.
(c) Kofin Al Midat Sodom: The "Sodom-like" character, as noted
above, is depicted as one who will adamantly insist on his legal rights, even
when relinquishing those rights would confer advantage on another while
leaving no adverse effects whatsoever upon himself. The Talmud postulated a
maxim that gave the law the power to prevent "Sodom" motivated acts,
though grounded in legal right, from realizing themselves, or in effect to force
one to forego his legal rights. If two heirs or partners (A and B) wish to
divide an estate and A owns an adjoining plot of land, A has the first option
to choose that portion of the estate abutting his property. Even though by
strict law B need not oblige A, the courts can force B to submit to A's choice
since failing to do so would be following the ways of "Sodom." Maimonides
extracts from this rule the general principle that wherever a particular course
of action would result in benefit to one party with no resulting detriment to a
second party, the courts are granted the auxiliary power to force the neutrally
affected party to concede.36 As Talmudic jurisprudence developed, so did the
number of such maxims come into force as bases for transforming moral
imperatives into legal constructions. Some notable examples are: the creation
of new categories of ownership not recognized by law "in the interests of
peace";37 progressive reforms in family law so as "to prevent ill-feeling" in
familial relationships;3 8 and the institution of legal fictions creating novel
property rights to promote friendly relations and "prevent inevitable quarrels"
among society's members.39 We can see, though, that the manner in which
equity operates to bring law into harmony with society differs from other
instrumentalities devised to accomplish the same goal in that, as Sir Henry
Maine quite accurately stated:
[Its claim to authority is grounded not on the prerogative of any external person
or body, not even on that of the magistrate who enunciates it, but on the special
nature of its principles, to which it is alleged that all law ought to conform. The
very conception of a set of principles, invested with a higher sacredness than those
of the original law and demanding application independently of the consent of any
external body, belongs to a much more advanced stage of thought than that to
which legal fictions originally suggested themselves.
40
In the context of our topic, all law ought to conform with the sacred
principle of "to do that which is right and good" which, in a sense, stands as
the overseer and ombudsman of the law.
Indeed, a flurry of debates developed over the course of later centuries
among Jewish legal scholars as to whether the courts had the power to sanc-
36 Mishneh Torah, supra note 29, at Hilkhot Shekhenim 12:3.
37 The Mishnah, supra note 21, at Gittin 5:8-9.
38 The Talmud, supra note 5, at Nashim II, Ketuboth 58b.
39 Mishneh Torah, supra note 29, at Hilkhot Gezela Vaaveda 17:8-9.
40 Maine, Ancient Law (16th ed. London: Spottiswoode, 1897) at 27-28.
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tion the use of the equitable principle of Lifnim with the full force of the law.
Many were in favour of the courts' imposing equitable settlements where they
saw fit to do so.41 But even those who have supported the sanctionability of
equity have provided for the restriction of its use to only those cases where
the liable party could oblige the court's verdict without excessive economic
injury to himself. The courts were thus prevented from burdening an impecu-
nious party with a Lifnim oriented settlement. Much of the debate has been
sparked by the following incident cited by the Talmud; R. Judah once fol-
lowed Mar Samuel into a crowded marketplace and asked, "If one found a
purse here would one be legally entitled to it?" Mar Samuel answered in the
affirmative. Then the question arose as to what the law would be if an
Israelite came and indicated an identification mark. Mar Samuel answered
that it must be returned. R. Judah was puzzled by the apparently contradic-
tory rulings when Mar Samuel answered, "This is Lifnim meshurat hadin."
The Talmud further relates that the father of Samuel found some asses
in the desert and returned them to their owner after a period of twelve
months, which is depicted as an act of Lifnim.42 The reason his action is
described as such is that, by Talmudic law, a presumption of abandonment
arises on a lost article that lies unclaimed for an unduly long time. So
Samuel's father, though fully entitled by law to maintain possession of the
asses, parted with them in a personal desire to fulfil higher moral impera-
tives. Virtually all the scholars agree that in such a case the courts must
attempt to persuade the finder to act in accord with Lifnim and relinquish
his rights, with the only point of contention being the limits of the sanctions
available to the court in imposing such an equitable solution.43 With this
passage we gain further insight into the multifarious dimensions of ethicaljurisprudence projected by the concept of Lifnim. The uniqueness of this
passage lies in the fact that it did not follow the customary procedure of
deriving the ethical imperative of Lifnim from Scriptural verse. Tosefot44
deals with this distinct feature by delineating separate categories of cases in
which Lifnim is the operative and guiding principle of equity:
(a) those cases in which there is some general obligation or liability imposed
across the board with certain classes of people enjoying an exclusive exemption,
e.g., the expert money-changer. And;
(b) those cases in which there is a universal release from any strict legal obliga-
tions, as in the present case where no one is obliged, by law, to return the article.
There seems to be no need for Scriptural derivation in cases belonging
to category (b), as the natural law of good conscience demands the return of
lost articles when there is no resultant monetary loss to the finder. On the
other hand, in category (a), where there is an apparent clash between the
natural principles of equity and the positive law of exemption, the sources
41 See, for example, Mordecai's (Hebrew) commentary in the Mishneh Torah, supra
note 29, at Baba Metz'a 2:157.
42 The Talmud, supra note 5, at Nezikin I, Baba Metz'a 24b.
43 The sanctions range from simple verbal persuasion to the threat of excommunica-
tion.
44 A compilation of extensive commentaries on the Talmud.
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must be consulted in order to raise Lifnim to its esteemed position as the
guardian of the spirit of equity within positive law (Din). The Rabbis
recognized a dual nature of equity that, on the one hand, was inherent in
the average moral sense of the community and required no backing to ensure
its validity, while on the other hand was deemed to be premised on previously
formulated (or, in our case, revealed) legal rules, i.e., "To do that which is
right and good," in order to preserve a credible rule of law. Whether the
Talmud attributed a conscientious action to the Divine source or not also
depended on the degree of equity in the particular situation.
A prime example of a case falling under category (a) follows closely
after the previously mentioned episode concerning lost articles. Under Jewish
law there exists an obligation to assist a fellow citizen in loading and unload-
ing animals. Relief from that obligation is provided for an elder whose dignity
would suffer as a result of manual labour. An incident is then recounted
where R. Ishmael ben R. Jose, in his own fashion, proceeded to fulfil the
primary obligation of assistance. Immediately the question arose whether R.
Ishmael was an elder for whom it was undignified. The Talmud resolved the
dilemma with the by now familiar response that "He [acted Lifnim,] as it says
in the Scriptures... . -45 In this case R. Ishmael waived the privilege of ex-
emption with which he was clothed as an elder and conducted himself as an
ordinary member of the community. We are concerned here with much more
than the relating of equitable guidelines of a mere advisory nature. Once
again Maimonides embodies the principle within the corpus of his code as
two separate laws:
(1) "One who walks the path of 'right and good' and [acts according
to Lifnim], should always return a lost article regardless of whether it is
dignified for him to do so."'41
(2) ".... One who is a Hasid47 and [acts according to Lifnim], even if
he were the Supreme Court Chief Justice, and who sees his comrade's animal
struggling under a heavy load should come to his assistance .... 48
The fact that the "higher law" is given concrete form in a code of law
permits the courts to take judicial notice of ethical precepts as a valid prin-
ciple of legal decision-making. They acknowledged, in the words of Pound,
that "ethics, too, is a science and not without principle. '49
V. QUASI-LEGAL MANIFESTATIONS OF LIFNIM
Various methods were developed by the courts that allowed them to
express disapproval of certain acts that violated the spirit of Lifnim. They
maintained only a quasi-legal status, however, since they were restricted to
45 The Talmud, supra note 5, at Nezikin I, Baba Metz'a 30b.
46 Mishneh Torah, supra note 29, at Hilkhot Gezela Vaaveda 11:17.
47 Maimonides here is following his own definition of Hasidut, which he equates
with the attribute of Lifnim, i.e., one who will go to extremes in order to attain a vir-
tuous character (Mishneh Torah, id. at Hilkhot Deot 1:5).
4 8 Mishneh Torah, id. at Hilkhot Rozeah 13:4.
49 Pound, Law and Morals (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1924)
at 63.
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verbal sanctions by the court. Thus, certain phrases of castigation were used
to prevent specific situations unconscionable in nature but within the strict
line of the law. Impotent as far as any strict legal sanctions were concerned,
the court could only utilize its power of persuasion and direct the uncon-
scionable party to a higher sense of morality or power (Divine) which de-
mands that justice be done rather than mere strict compliance with the law.
(a) Mi Shepora:50 Under Jewish law, as long as a substantive act of
possession is not exercised over an object, (e.g., pulling or raising it), a
transfer of property remains incomplete. Therefore, if there was an agreement
to sell and money exchanged hands but there was no act of possession with
respect to the item in question, either party would be able to renege on the
original agreement and cancel the transaction. Though the court cannot com-
pel completion of the deal, since by law the withdrawing party is perfectly
entitled to do so, it can subject him to the following censure: "He who
punished the generations of the Flood, and of the Dispersion, the inhabitants
of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the Egyptians at the [Red] Sea, He will exact
vengeance of him who does not stand by his word."' In the present case it
has an effect similar to the English equitable maxim that "Equity looks upon
what is done as that which ought to be done." Though English equity would
treat the subject-matter of agreement in the same way as if the act contem-
plated had been completely executed, the Jewish courts could only resort to
impressing that principle on the party's conscience by way of appeal to a
"higher authority."5 2
(b) Laseth Yedei Shamayim:5 3 If A came, of his own free will, and ad-
mitted stealing from either B or C, in doubt as to which one, then A must
pay the full amount stolen to B and C if he wishes to "fulfill his obligation
towards heaven." By strict Din, however, he need only pay out the total
amount stolen and divide it between B and C. The law again explicitly ex-
tends recognition to two forums, one of strict legal propositions and the other
of human conscience and heavenly design, within which there exist varying
standards of human conduct. Though powerless to enforce ethical impera-
tives, the courts devised their own unique methods which gained technical
meanings and had the effect of pressuring the subjected party via an appeal
to conscience and fear of a higher authority. 4 Severely limited in the sanc-
tions that could be applied in such cases, the judge working within the
Talmudic tradition realized that:
[He] is under a duty, within the limits of his power of innovation, to maintain a
relation between law and morals, between the precepts of jurisprudence and those
of reason and good conscience. 55
50 The Mishnah, supra note 21, at Baba Metz'a 48a.
51 The Talmud, supra note 5, at Nezikin I, Baba Metz'a 48a.
52 Id. A debate follows as to the form that the Mi Shepora takes. Abaye con-
tends that it is a mere admonishment while Raba argues that it is an actual curse. (It
must be realized that a curse in ancient times was as useful a sanction as any.)
5s Mishneh Torah, supra note 29, at Hilkhot Gezela 4:9-10.
54For a host of other such examples, see Herzog, Moral Rights and Duties in fewish
Law (1929), 41 Juridical Rev. 60.
55 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1921) at 133-34.
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VI. PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF EQUITY IN TALMUDIC LAW
It would be enlightening at this point in our study to interpolate a classic
Talmudic debate, philosophic and exegetic in nature, as to the manner in
which the Biblical origins of equity or "rightness" (Yosher) was perceived
and the role it must be assigned within the framework of the Jewish legal
system. The debate is concerned with an interpretive analysis of the verse "to
do that which is right (Yosher) and good (Tov) in the eyes of the Lord,"
which, as has been discussed, is the very cornerstone of the Jewish concept
of equity. We shall designate Yosher as Jewish equity and Tov as a standard
of conduct falling short of Yosher or ideal justice.
This dual aspect of justice suggesting two corresponding modes of con-
duct or ethic perplexed the Rabbinic mind and provided fertile soil for the
debate that followed between the two foremost Jewish legal scholars of
their time: R. Akiba and R. Ishmael.56 The argument focuses analytically on
the relation between the two terms and the conclusion of the verse "in the
eyes of the Lord." R. Akiba was of the opinion that Tov referred to the latter
part of the verse while Yosher must refer to "the eyes of man." R. Ishmael
maintained the contrary view that Tov referred to man and Yosher to the
Divine. There is a subtle yet profound disagreement within the context of this
exchange as to the fundamental definition and purpose attributed to Yosher
by the Torah. R. Akiba seems to be acknowledging the fact that law and
justice do not always coincide, since what is good in the eyes of the Lord
may not necessarily be equitable when brought down to the level of man.
It is submitted that R. Akiba has formulated the basis for much of the
discussion until now, which is that Toy and Yosher, the demands of G-d and
those of society, the strict letter of the law and the ideal humane law Lifnim,
not only occupy different positions on the scale of justice, but respectively
possess competing objectives. On the other hand, R. Ishmael, who equates
Yosher with the proscriptions of the Lord (strict law), advocates the view
that an inherent sense of equity pervades the strict law ("in the eyes of the
Lord") which must not be sacrificed, and indeed by definition is prevented
from being sacrificed for the sake of a "higher" good in the eyes of man.
The fact that a rule has been enshrined in the Torah or derived from it must
be regarded by man as Yosher-not to be violated by individual subjective
notions of Tov or law. If we replace "common law" with the "Jewish civil
law," the following dicta of Lord Devlin seem to be an echoing of R.
Ishmael's position:
The great virtue of the common law is that it sets out to solve legal problems by
the application to them of principles which the ordinary man is expected to recog-
nize as sensible and just; their application in any particular case may produce what
seems to him a hard result, but as principle they should be within his under-
standing and merit his approval.57
5 Tosefta-Shekalim 2:2. The version is based on S. Lieberman's rendering of the
texts in Tosefta Kipeshuta at 677.
57 Ingram v. Little, [1961] 1 Q.B. 31 at 73, [1960] 3 All E.R. 332 (C.A.) at 351
(emphasis added).
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We can detect sentiments of the opposing view of R. Akiba in a recent
decision by Lord Denning M.R., in which he stated:
Every unjust decision is a reproach to the law or to the judge who administers it. If
the law should be in danger of doing injustice, then equity should be called in to
remedy it. Equity was introduced to mitigate the rigour of the law.5 8
An excellent illustration of a substantive legal argument arising out of
the respective schools of thought is provided by the Mishnah pertaining to
the manner in which the Temple treasury funds were allocated for the fiscal
year.59 On three separate occasions during the year, an individual was ap-
pointed to enter the vault and appropriate the requisite funds for the upcom-
ing portion of the year. The fear arose that suspicion of embezzlement would
be cast upon that individual since no one was allowed to accompany him into
the vault. Accordingly R. Akiba held that he must not enter garbed in any
clothes that could possibly conceal any funds, effectively muzzling any sus-
picion of theft. R. Ishmael, though, ruled that he must be searched upon
entering and leaving the vault. R. Akiba would have concurred with R.
Ishmael as to the essential rule of law, but in consideration of ideal justice
and ethics, the embarrassment that would result if one were to follow R.
Ishmael's procedure persuaded R. Akiba to innovate a progressive substitute
that would pay due respect to human dignity without violating the spirit
and rule of law. Since Yosher is what man must perceive in the codification
and administration of the law, so it can be used as a judicial tool to circum-
vent the rigours often imposed by the strict law and arrive at more equitable
solutions where "Justice is not only done but seen to be done". R. Ishmael's
school of thought, which relies on the Supreme arbiter of Yosher and iden-
tifies strict law with Yosher, would tend to stunt judicial creativity by requir-
ing the judge to disregard social notions of Toy in favour of the higher Yosher
of strict law. The rule is resolved in favour of R. Akiba, thus paving the way
for the concept of Lifnim to influence the progressive construction of Jewish
law. Taken to their logical extremes and supplanted in the contemporary
situation, the core of the debate is captured in the distinction drawn by Chief
Justice Laskin, "[b]etween a purely formal, mechanical view of the law,
antiseptic and detached, and a view of the law that sees it as purposive, re-
lated to our social and economic conditions, and serving ends that express the
character of our organized society."0
VII. IDENTIFICATION OF LAW WITH EQUITY
The unique manner in which Lifnim and the principle of equity were
incorporated into Jewish law prevented it from following Pound's stages in
the evolution of law in which equity matures and eventually hardens, sinking
into decadence. Though it became a powerful tool in the shaping of Jewish
law, it resisted temptations to assume the rigours and procedures of the strict
law. The spheres of morality and ethics within which the principle of Lifnim
58 Re Vanderville's Trusts (No. 2), [19741 Ch. 269 (C.A.) at 322.
5i9 According to the thesis developed by Lieberman, supra note 56.
6OLaskin, The Function of the Law (1973), 11 Alta. L. Rev. 118 at 119.
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freely roams recognize no bounds from the perspective of the individual
member of society and provide the background for judicial decision making.
One final illustration, belonging to a class of its own, shall assist us in
determining the scope and regard that Jewish law reserved for equity in gov-
erning commercial relations. It is recorded that Rabba ben R. Huna hired
some porters who, in the process of their labour, negligently broke a barrel
of wine. In order to guarantee restitution Rabba exercised a lien on the
workers' clothes in his possession. The workers then approached Ray who
ordered Rabba:
"Return them their garments," he ordered. "Is that the law?" he enquired. "Even
so," he rejoined, "that thou mayest walk in the way of good men." Their garments
having been returned, they observed, "We are poor men, have worked all day, and
are in need; are we to get nothing?" "Go and pay them," he ordered. "Is that the
law," he asked. "Even so," was his reply: "and keep the path of the righteous." 01
Rashi comments that the principle upon which the Din in this case was
pronounced was that of Lifnim. Rabba was within his legal rights both to
exercise a lien and to withhold wages and yet he was compelled, by law, to
relinquish both of those rights. In stark contrast to the cases thus far discussed,
Rabba suffered a substantial economic injury as a result of this decision.
Strangely enough, this appears to be the sole occasion where the Talmud
declares the direct enforceability of Lifnim as Din. The very texture of Din
is woven with fine threads of ethics resulting in the case before us balancing
injustices with a scale weighted in favour of the labourer. The Judge then
turns to his discretionary power which derives its source from the concept of
Lifnim in order to alleviate any hardships that may arise on different occa-
sions. "To do that which is right and good" often demanded that law's goal
of certainty sacrifice itself for the sake of individual justice.62
Jewish law's concern for and recognition of the integration of equity as
an essential constituent of law leading to justice manifests itself in an entire
Mishnaic tractate devoting itself solely to the setting of ethical guidelines
pointing to an enhanced moral and just life. The telling feature of "Ethics of
our Fathers" (Pirke Aboth) is its location in the order concerning itself with
Torts (Nezikin) and immediately follows those tractates that deal with the
rules and procedures concerning the judiciary. Maimonides explains the sig-
nificance of this in the following fashion:
Common laymen are not in as dire a need for this as are judges, for when laymen
are not ethically constituted, the adverse effects are highly personal, whereas when
the judge is not in command of an ethical character, he damages both himself and
other members of society. Thus "Fathers" commenced with judicial standards of
ethics ... (one of which points out) that the judge must always attempt a com-
61 The Talmud, supra note 5, at Nezikin I, Baba Metz'a 83a. (Verse quoted is from
Proverbs 2:20.)
62 As M. Elon points out in his scholarly work Hamishphat Haivri at 179, this Tal-
mudic passage provides a basis, according to one contemporary Jewish legal scholar, for
the obligation of severance pay in Jewish law:
Judges have the power to draw money from masters in favour of their servants,
wherever the situation arises which calls for "walking in the ways of good men
and keeping the path of the righteous."
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promise (instead of actual Din) and, if possible, never to enter upon a process of
strict application of the law but to always apply the principles of compromise
between two litigants,-this is the ideal.08
An integral component of a judge's legal education consists of attaining
an awareness of the principles of equity, fairness, and good conscience in
order that he may apply those very principles wherever possible. He must be
able to mitigate the harshness of the law when necessary and "not to rely
over much on legality-on the technical rules of the law-but ever to seek
those things which are right and true; for there alone will you find the road
to justice."'64
The identity of Jewish law with the natural principle of justice is exem-
plified by the manner in which the treatise is introduced. It prologues its
ethical pedagogy with a genealogy of the tradition of the law, tracing it back
to the original source with the words, "Moses received the Torah at Sinai."
R. Obadia Mibartinura, in his commentary on this passage, reflects the rela-
tionship between law and principles of equity by explaining:
Since this tractate is not derived from any explicit commandments of the Torah
as are the other tractates, but is only morality and ethics, and since other civiliza-
tions' philosophers compiled treatises on ethics which sprang from their own
hearts, the author here, therefore, commences with "Moses received the Torah ..."
that is to say that the ethical precepts contained in this tractate do not arise from
any subjective notions of justice on the part of the Mishnaic scholars but rather
these also originated at Sinai.65
These are not arbitrary nor subjective fundamentals of justice but form
an indigenous part of the strict law. The principles engendering equity are
regarded as on par with law and, in fact, equity is "one of the names under
which is concealed the creative force which animates the life of the law....
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have examined an early attempt at the incorporation of the rules and
principles of equity into an institutional body of law. Though the principles
of equity may, as Lord Evershed found, "illustrate, nay illuminate, but never
precisely define, the concept which lies behind, understood but unexpressed,"
0
Jewish law has valiantly strived consistently to apply the "inexpressable."
Talmudic jurisprudence on the development of equity as a conceptual and
practical basis for a system of law provides us with a comprehensive portrayal
of the manner in which the law approaches justice through the various de-
vices that equity supplies for that purpose. The very terms in Hebrew that
stand for the source book of all Jewish law, i.e., the Torah and the legal
63 Author's translation of Maimonides, Introduction to Commentary on the Mish-
nah (Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav Kook, n. date) at 54-56.
84 Denning, The Road to Justice (London: Stevens, 1955) at 6.
65 See Obadia Mibartinura's (Hebrew) commentary on the Mishnah, supra note 21,
at Mishnah Avot 1:1.06 Brutau, "Juridical Evolution and Equity," in Newman, ed., Essays in Jurispru-
dence in Honor of Roscoe Pound (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962) at 84.
17 Evershed, Aspects of English Equity (Three Lectures) (Jerusalem: Magnes Press,
1954) at 17.
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system itself, the Halakha, suggest a far more flexible framework than strict
text-book law. Torah translates as "teaching" or "guiding" while Halakha
conveys the idea of "walking" or "directing" in the sense of a pathway. The
law is neither fixed nor finalized but open-ended and pointed in the direction
of justice. The Rabbis boldly declared that the most cherished ideal of
Shalom (Peace) could not possibly prevail in a society governed solely by
the strictures of the law: "Where there is strict justice there is no peace. '68
So it is that the most tragic event of Jewish history is causally linked to a
decadent and rigid system of law totally oblivious to and devoid of any sense
of equity or good conscience. As "peace" cannot tolerate strict law if it is to
prevail, so the city symbolizing peace could not endure the moral vacuum
engendered by such a system prompting the Talmud to its painful conclusion
that:
Jerusalem was destroyed only because they gave judgments therein in accordance
with Biblical law ... because they based their judgments [strictly] upon Biblical
law, and did not go beyond the requirements of the law.69
68 The Talmud, supra note 5, at Nezikin III, Sanhedrin 6b.
69 The Talmud, id. at Nezikin I, Baba Metzi'a 30b.
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